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ARTICLES
Criteria for the Quality of Inquiry
Willem L. Wardekker
Department of Education
Vrije Universiteit
Researchers working in Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) need to develop criteria for the ade-
quacy of the processes and products of research that is founded on the central tenets of that theory. Crite-
ria like validity and generalizability are not universal, but have been developed from a specific theory of
knowledge use. This relation is explained both for the nomological and the interpretive paradigms, and
suggestions are made for the development of criteria in the CHAT paradigm on a similar basis.
PARADIGMS AND CRITERIA
Faced with the problem of having to judge research reports submitted for publication, journal editors
in the fields of educational, psychological, and sociological research find themselves more and more
in an awkward position (cf. Donmoyer, 1996; Stronach, Hustler, & Edwards, 1997). It is a position,
moreover, that is paralleled by the one in which judges of research proposals are often put. In “an era
of paradigm proliferation,” as Donmoyer calls it, there is no easy way to judge the quality of research
because each paradigm claims to have its own set of criteria for that quality. To make matters worse,
only the standard nomological or “quantitative” paradigm can boast well-defined and more or less
consistent criteria, whereas researchers working within the interpretive or “qualitative” paradigm ei-
ther refer to widely different criteria related to a host of sub-paradigms (see, e.g., Denzin & Lincoln,
1998, or Potter, 1996, for a broad but not nearly exhaustive overview) or just claim that “accepted”
criteria of validity, reliability, and generalizability do not strictly apply, without offering alternatives.
This situation not only poses problems for the judges of research, but also for the researchers them-
selves, because it is difficult for them to foresee according to which set of criteria their work will be
assessed. The procedure Donmoyer proposes (having texts judged by a wide range of reviewers) may
be the only practical one under the circumstances and has the virtue of being democratic, but it can
hardly contribute to a solution to this problem. And indeed, there may not be a generally acceptable
solution as long as the problem is formulated in this way, because reaching a solution presupposes ac-
cepting the existence of different paradigms—something that runs counter to the tenets of the
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nomological paradigm in the first place. But if we cannot hope to convince everybody, we can at least
try to show that the present situation is not the only possibility.
The “paradigm wars” cannot be stopped by adopting a practical, democratic, or pragmatic
stance. We need to formulate the problem that keeps the camps divided and then find a way to re-
formulate it in terms that would allow us to see some kind of synthesis. This is a task that
Habermas took upon himself in trying to show that critical theory could provide such a synthesis,
but his analysis seems flawed (cf. Miedema & Wardekker, 1999). I try to show, without being able
to give a full account, that cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT) might be able to do better in
this respect.
This would in the end solve a big problem for those researchers who consider themselves mem-
bers of the community basing its work on CHAT. Their situation is even more complicated: in this
group, some researchers keep to the standards of the nomological paradigm, although in many
cases with some uneasiness; others adopt a form of interpretive research, for example in the narra-
tive tradition; whereas some feel that CHAT researchers would do best to develop their own set of
criteria, that is, to position CHAT as a paradigm in its own right. My position does not coincide
with any of these; rather, I intend to point out the possibility that we might understand all of these
positions as different instances of one principle. Such a step, if realized, would not make the “par-
adigm wars” go away, but it would make them less interesting and instead point our attention to-
ward different problems and difficulties in the realm of research methods.
The following, then, is offered in the hope of providing an incentive for further discussion in
which we reconsider the presuppositions of such criteria as validity and generalizability to find
reformulations and starting points for new specifications of criteria. The gist of this contribution is
that concepts like validity, reliability, and generalizability do not have a fixed meaning and do not
by themselves define the scientific character of research. Rather, they form part of a paradigmatic
discussion in which their seemingly objective character is used to exert power. Although I will fo-
cus on research in education, specifically research that intends to be of help in changing teacher
practices, the implications are not restricted to such research. I hope that others will join in by
spelling out such implications.
HOW TO COMPARE PARADIGMS
Normally, we talk about the “paradigm war” in social studies as waged between two positions: the
nomological and the interpretive paradigms. I will conform to this usage, but we will have to ask
what exactly we mean by speaking about paradigms here and how to understand the difference be-
tween the two.
I have assumed that using the concept of paradigm is valid for the social field, even if its origi-
nator, Thomas Kuhn, would say that in our field of study there are no paradigms, just a confusing
number of schools of thought. For him, probably, behaviorism and cognitive psychology would
have qualified as different paradigms, except for the fact that neither of these theories ever could
be considered “the” way of thinking in the social field. Others will indeed maintain that there are
many theoretical paradigms, but not all of them claim specific methods and criteria for research
quality. If I speak of two paradigms here, I use the term paradigm in the field of social studies in a
stricter sense than Kuhn did. To be able to speak of paradigms in this sense, it will not be enough to
point out a difference in theoretical principles, even if these entail some specific criterion (such as,
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in certain branches of cognitive psychology, the claim that a good theory must lend itself to com-
puter simulation).
But neither is it enough to claim a methodological difference. Sometimes the “paradigm wars”
are equated with a controversy between quantitative and qualitative methods. Although there is
some truth in this, it does not reach the core of the controversy. Methods may be chosen according
to the implications of a research question. Paradigms, however, are ways of thinking that generate
certain types of research questions and therefore lead to different interpretations of the results ob-
tained by such methods (Smagorinsky, 1998). I would like to reserve “quantitative” and “qualita-
tive” for research methods in which the categories into which the data fall are or are not
prespecified by the researcher. There is then no necessary connection between paradigms and
methods: Qualitative methods may be used within a nomological paradigm, for instance, and I
rather think that both quantitative and qualitative methods may be used in CHAT-based research.
It is not the character of the methods themselves that defines a paradigmatic difference, but the
way in which the results are interpreted and used.
Often the difference between the nomological and the interpretive paradigms is seen as an op-
position between explanation and understanding. I do not think that is adequate. Such a distinction
is rather superficial: It tells us there is a difference, but does not explain why. Logically, it does not
seem necessary, as it is perfectly possible to see beliefs and reasons as “causative” factors in an ex-
planation of behavior (see, e.g., Bhaskar, 1979). It seems directed more against behaviorism than
against the dominance of the nomological paradigm as such. This is probably one of the reasons so
many people now maintain that there is no need for a strict opposition and the paradigm wars
ought to be over.
Indeed, if the difference were situated only in either the intentions of the researcher in produc-
ing a certain type of contribution to a “body of knowledge” or in the way human behavior is theo-
retically understood as either caused by external factors or guided by beliefs (surely, it can be
both, dependent upon the situation), there would be no reason to speak of two competing para-
digms any more. But the paradigmatic difference as I understand it runs deeper. In my view, the
difference between paradigms is not based on how research is done nor on what is researched, but
on why it is done. It is based on two different views of how the results of research may contribute
to better human (cultural) practices, on two views of the relation between knowing and acting—in
short, on two different views of learning in which research results are the input of the learning pro-
cess. Or, to put it differently, it is based on two views of how potential users of research results
may be convinced and what this will mean for their future behaviors. Even the idea of contributing
to a body of knowledge as a goal of inquiry is to some extent interpreted differently within the two
paradigmatic views, because it rests on a specific idea of what potential users need. These views,
which I explicate, in their turn are part of an ongoing controversy about how to define and study
mankind—as primarily natural or primarily cultural—that has given rise to “two psychologies”
(Cole, 1996) and that ultimately rests on a Cartesian dualism. It is exactly because CHAT theory
offers a third view of this learning process between research and practice that it can aspire to
bridge the gap between the two. This implies that evaluating CHAT research on the basis of crite-
ria developed within one of the other paradigms exclusively means that the full potential of that
theory cannot be actualized.
In the following I explicate the learning theories implied in these paradigms and what these
mean for the criteria for “good” research and for good research reports. I need to emphasize that
these explications do not in any substantial way rest on an analysis of what researchers actually do
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or how they understand what they do. Rather, I try to reconstruct the logic behind what is consid-
ered good research from a certain point of view. At the same time, I will point out some of the less
desirable consequences of these points of view, as made visible by the reconstruction.
THE NOMOLOGICAL PARADIGM
The nomological paradigm rests on a rational, or rather a logical, image of mankind and its (every-
day) practices. It says that people want to, or at least should want to, act in the way that is the most
effective in a given situation and with given aims. Acting means creating the conditions that enable
a natural law to work in a way that will produce the desired results. Thus, a teacher creates condi-
tions under which learning processes, in a way, must happen. If students do not learn, that means
the right conditions for those processes were not created in that situation. Some of these conditions
may be in the teacher’s sphere of influence; some are not. But generally, the more the teacher
knows about the situation and the processes she desires to happen, the more she will be able to cre-
ate the right conditions. Competent and effective actions are supposed to be based on adequate
knowledge. This knowledge, in most cases, is distributed. The teacher herself does not need to
know everything about learning processes; she can leave the details to educationists and textbook
writers. All she needs is some recipes for acting in specific situations and the ability to determine
what the relevant characteristics of a given situation are. And even that ability may be distributed,
for instance among a testing service.
In such a view of practice, no attention is given to its historical and cultural aspects, which con-
struct the situation in a specific way and thus guide actions. If anything, these are viewed as obsta-
cles to rational behavior. Practice is conceived of only in terms of individual or collective ends and
the rational means to reach these ends. Better practice is practice that is guided by better knowl-
edge of pre-existing laws that are independent of human action and better ways to handle con-
straints and restrictions that apply in a specific situation, constraints that may be human
constructions, like laws, funding problems, and the like.
Knowledge is the operative concept in this approach. The effectiveness of actions depends on
the adequacy of our knowledge of two things: first, of the natural laws that can be put to work for
us so we may obtain our goals, and second, of the actual conditions in a specific situation that need
to be manipulated. In both cases, empirical research is meant to deliver the most adequate knowl-
edge possible. Adequate here means giving an accurate description of laws, forces, and conditions
as they are (at least, as far as we can know). Research reports focus on convincing the reader that
the results are accurate in that sense; that the world could not be different from the description
given here. Note that knowledge is considered to be a commodity that is transferable from one sit-
uation to many others (cf. Cobb & Bowers, 1999).
What is considered an adequate product of research, then, is determined by our notions of the
way it could and should be used in practice. Thus, the criteria for good research ultimately refer to
the use that is (or rather, ought to be) made of its results, even in the nomological paradigm—that
is, they rest on an image of good learning and good acting, on what Bruner (1996) called a theory
of mind. This is also true of the interpretive paradigm—although its image of good learning and
acting is different. But in both the nomological and interpretive approaches, this foundation of
methods and criteria is seldom made explicit. Neither, in the nomological paradigm, is this image
of the good research user itself subjected to scientific scrutiny, for reasons that I discuss.
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To the nomological way of thinking, such an explication is not even really necessary. For its
underlying theory of mind says that individual rational people act according to the knowledge
they possess. They can act differently, for example on the basis of neurotic compulsion or of
unanalyzed feelings, but that is irrational behavior that is itself in need of an explanation. They can
also understand public knowledge differently, but in that case they make an error, as there is really
only one adequate way to interpret knowledge correctly. In that sense, adequate knowledge is
thought to be objective, that is, independent of personal interpretation. Knowledge is considered
to be best when it is valid without restrictions as to time or place, which means that “good” knowl-
edge is useable in many cases that were not foreseen when the original research was done. Produc-
tion and utilization of knowledge can be separated. The practical usefulness of knowledge is thus
implied in the model and not really a criterion. The attention can be transferred to the mode of
knowledge production: if the production process is adequate, the resulting product will be
too—hence the emphasis on validity, reliability, and generalizability. Such criteria are concerned
with knowledge production, and their discussion is limited to the circle of co-researchers, but ulti-
mately they are based on a theory of the mind of the knowledge user and aim at establishing the ra-
tionality of using the results. They focus on ensuring the context-independency of knowledge
exactly because such knowledge is deemed to be the most useful.
The separation between production and utilization is reflected in the separation of the empiri-
cal and the practical. Research is concerned with the empirical: a situation created for the purposes
of research in which natural laws and their conditions will become apparent. If research is done in
an educational situation, for instance a classroom, this does not by itself make the research practi-
cal or practice-oriented, because the researcher sees only those aspects of the classroom that are
relevant to the research question. To the nomological researcher, a classroom is not a practice situ-
ation, but a place where data are to be found. Such research does not, to paraphrase Lewin (as cited
by Cole, 1996, p. 225), take its point of departure in the subject’s life space; instead, it changes that
life space to fit the requirements of a predefined set of research conditions: it makes an experiment
happen in a non-laboratory situation. The distinction is essential to good research in the
nomological tradition, for if teachers were to begin to alter their practice in the course of the re-
search on the basis of its results, or even of the fact that research is being done, this would “con-
taminate” the data, which would then become useless (Smagorinsky, 1995). Data should describe
the world as it is; they should be objective in the sense that they are the product of the state of the
world and of nothing else. Most methodology is there to ensure that this really is the case, and it is
not accidental that most methods books describe the controlled experiment as the paradigmatic
case of research. The greater part of the research report is meant to convince other researchers that
this condition of objectivity has been rigorously observed. The way research reports are structured
(say, along the lines of the American Psychological Association’s scheme) ensures that the dis-
cussion is focused on the validity of the data, not on the practical use of the theory.
Of course, educational research does not escape the pressure to justify itself exactly by its prac-
tical relevance. But the classroom as a practice situation often comes into focus only after data
have been gathered and conclusions have been drawn. At that moment, implementation projects
may be started to show teachers what, according to the research results, a rational way of conduct-
ing educational practice is. Such projects are almost by definition one-sided because the re-
searcher knows something he wants the teachers to learn and use. The premise of such projects is
that teachers will want to act rationally and will thus adopt the researcher’s knowledge. If they
construe the situation differently, that just goes to show how irrational human beings can be. If re-
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search results are not used, this does not reflect on the criteria for knowledge production and only
in a limited way on the content of theories; instead, innovation strategies are devised to make utili-
zation happen. Teachers can, by definition, never be more rational than researchers. This also
makes for a severe limitation in those cases where research is done under the “ownership” of prac-
titioners—either in the form of “practice-oriented” research by researchers hired on a project basis
or of research done by teachers themselves within the nomological paradigm. Such research,
which has no option but to take the problem definition of the practitioners involved for granted
whereas still couching it in terms of general laws, will often produce no more than short-term
problem solutions without wider relevance (Edwards, in press).
If teachers cannot be more rational than researchers, neither can pupils be more rational than
teachers. It is clear that this way of thinking, this theory of mind, also has influence on the curricu-
lum. It indicates that pupils should acquire models of the world as it really and objectively is—that
is, as science says it is. Recent innovations based on (a Piagetian brand of) constructivism, in
which self-regulation is the central concept, do not change this; they just say that such models
have to be acquired by actively constructing them, not by passively receiving them, and that the
conditions for this construction vary according to individual development. Still, the preference in
the curriculum for teaching objective knowledge that allows for only one correct interpretation
and precisely because of that can be used in many situations remains intact.
Both in research and in teaching, however, this way of thinking in terms of generalizability as a
first criterion of knowledge has come under attack. The concept of ecological validity has proven to
be very complicated. The work of Cole and associates (Cole, 1996; Newman, Griffin & Cole, 1989),
who were virtually unable to make the same psychological task happen in different (experimental)
contexts, gives rise to the idea that context is not just the specific circumstances in which to look for
the working of general natural processes. Instead, context is what defines the importance of aspects
of a situation. However, within a “natural psychology” (as opposed to a cultural one), the concept of
context proves very elusive, because in reality what is important in a situation is dependent on the in-
terpretations of the actors involved. Unless we have good reasons to believe that the interpretations
of different actors are essentially the same (and the work of Cole and associates casts doubt on ex-
actly this supposition), this means that providing them with decontextualized information will not
automatically coordinate or “rationalize” their actions. The image of the “rational” user that is be-
hind the paradigm clearly needs some refinement. However, this cannot be done with the means for
theory-development that this paradigm has at its disposal, for these can only lead to a general theory
of interpretations, so that the argument becomes circular.
Essentially the same problem comes to light in the concept of self-regulation. Self-regulation
in fact tells pupils to act in such a way that they become subject to the laws of learning. Thus, pu-
pils are at the same time seen as subject to natural (learning) laws, and (in their role as users of sci-
entific information) as rational actors who can use natural laws to their advantage. In other words,
human agency is assumed, but goes unexplained. (For a Deweyan critique of the dualism inherent
in the concept of self-regulation, see Prawat, 1998.) Rationality and agency are not categories that
can be subsumed under the concept of general law.
This problem is recognized within the paradigm. It is, in essence, a consequence of the fact that
it has been transferred from natural science (where it is perfectly adequate) to the study of human
beings, where the researcher, the subject, and the user can coincide. The standard solution is to
point at the difference between the context of justification and the context of use, with research be-
ing done only in the former. A different formulation for the same principle is that the paradigm as-
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sumes a methodological determinism, but not an ontological one: in theories, human actors are
regarded as if determined by laws, but we don’t have to believe that they really are. As can be in-
ferred from the above examples, however, this solution is inadequate.
THE INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM
The interpretive paradigm rests on a totally different image of how research contributes to better
practice. This is because its theory of mind is different. The theory implicit in the interpretive para-
digm is of human beings as interpreters and constructors of a meaningful world. Humans think
about themselves, about other people, and about the world and attach meaning to everything they
encounter. These meanings guide their practices. They are essentially individual constructions, al-
though coordinated with those of others through common elements. People do not discover the
world, as in the nomological paradigm, but rather construct it. Of course, this construction is not
seen as totally free; it has to take into account the physical properties of the world and the construc-
tions of other people in the same cultural group. Also, it has a history and is built up through per-
sonal experience and meaning-making. Still, meaning is always bound to the individual and to spe-
cific situations; within the interpretive tradition, supra-individual culturally and historically
formed narratives (including the “body of knowledge” as produced by scientific inquiry) are
mostly seen as just so many possible sources of elements for individual construction processes.
Among other things, this implies that “knowledge” in the traditional sense does not guide actions
unless and until it becomes “contextualized” within the (re)construction of a complex of meanings.
Within the paradigm, opinions differ on how exactly people construct and maintain meanings
and complexes of meanings and on how to reconstruct these in research. This has given rise to a
host of sub-paradigms, for example, phenomenology, ethnography, and narrative research. Each
of these has its own rules and criteria for securing the quality of the “data,” that is, the researcher’s
interpretation of meanings. This situation reflects the fact that the whole paradigm itself rests on
an interpretation of what is human about human beings, and this basic question allows for differ-
ing answers. In other words, it reflects the self-reflexivity of the paradigm, a property we found
missing in the nomological paradigm. This implies that there cannot be the same kind of discrep-
ancy between the image of humans as created in theory and the image of the potential user. But it
also implies that what the nomological paradigm traditionally considers (good) research also rests
on an interpretation, and there can be multiple interpretations, each with their own methods and
criteria. In a sense, therefore, it is against the very nature of this paradigm to suppose there could
be common criteria, even between the sub-paradigms, but it is possible to discern guidelines for
research that are based on the nature of the way meanings guide our actions.
Given this situation, it is (according to the interpretive way of thinking) impossible for another
person (e.g., a researcher) to convince anybody by purely “rational” means (in the sense of the
nomological paradigm) that he or she has a better story about the world and that actions should be
guided by that story rather than the one the first person has constructed for herself. The rational
and objective knowledge as produced by the nomological paradigm will only be incorporated into
a person’s construction of the world if that person is able and willing to integrate it, to give it a
meaning within that construction. In other words, nomological knowledge can at most guide ac-
tions in a heuristic way. But nomological knowledge is not privileged in this respect; other sources
may be just as influential. In fact, whereas the nomological paradigm tries to convince potential
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users that the world could not be any other way than it is depicted in the research results, the inter-
pretive paradigm tries to show the user that her interpretations of the world could be different,
without asserting that any particular interpretation is “better” in a general sense. The criterion for
whether a particular insight will influence future behavior is not its truth or objectivity, but
whether a person feels that a particular interpretation of the world contributes to his or her own
practical wisdom or phronesis (cf. Kessels & Korthagen, 1996); thus, its impact is dependent on
the person’s life history. Learning is not a purely cognitive phenomenon; rather, it is directly con-
nected to the development of personal identity. Note that this is a very individualistic picture of
learning that does not make a lot of provisions for the grounding of learning in cooperative prac-
tices. As a consequence, it may tend towards relativism.
What research in the interpretive paradigm does is to find out what meanings people con-
struct, how they construct them, and how these constructions guide their actions, with the inten-
tion of providing “heuristic schemes” that people may or may not use. Research does not
contribute to an ideally ever more consistent “body of knowledge,” but to a relatively loosely
ordered collection of such interpretive schemes. Such schemes should offer new ways of seeing
and interpreting familiar events (Edwards, 2001), but it is not implied that a new way is also a
better way. The only people who can decide whether it is “better” are the people who do, or do
not, incorporate the schemes offered into their own life histories. Therefore, the criterion for the
adequacy of such schemes can never be that people actually use them, because this is up to the
meaning-making of actual people and may differ from situation to situation. As in the
nomological tradition, then, the actual use that is made of the products of research in practice
does not play a significant role in the research itself. Criteria are based instead on projections of
what is most likely to be of value to potential users. Hence, the “heuristic quality” of the re-
search report, its power to enlighten people by making them really understand the narratives
that were the object of study, can be an important criterion. The pleas for “thick description” in
research reports, for instance, are based on such projections. The research process itself, on the
other hand, is guided by the idea of neutrality; that is, the outcome should be an understanding
of the interpretations of the research subjects in which the interpretations of the researchers play
as small a role as possible (although they may, in some sub-paradigms, be considered an ade-
quate or even necessary starting point). As in the nomological tradition, the ideal is for the re-
searcher to be transparent or invisible. The researcher is never a participant in the sense that by
her actions the narratives must not be contaminated. A paradoxical consequence is that, al-
though the intention of the research is to provide people with heuristic schemes in an area cho-
sen and delineated by the researcher, and although the researcher may be considered an expert
on such schemes, nevertheless the schemes offered as a product of the research can never be
those of the researcher himself. Most of the methods in the interpretive paradigm (as far as they
go) are intended to insure this form of neutrality and distance.
In interpretive research, then, the concepts of validity and objectivity can be used, but their
meaning is restricted to a methodological one: the researcher’s rendition of the subjects’ stories
should be adequate, but this does not imply anything about the quality of those stories themselves
in terms of the effectiveness of behavior guided by them. For that reason, many researchers in this
tradition prefer to speak of “adequacy” as the sole criterion for research. One consequence of this
is that an “outside” critique of interpretations, such as a critique of ideology, is impossible. This
contributes to the tendency towards relativism that is inherent in the paradigm, and it is the main
point that the “critical” paradigm tries to remedy. I will not go into a discussion of that proposed
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paradigm here (but cf. Miedema & Wardekker, 1999) because I think that CHAT offers better
possibilities in that respect.
In sum, the interpretive paradigm manages to avoid the type of inconsistency that we saw the
nomological paradigm lead to. However, it does so at a cost: it lacks the possibility of explaining
why people come to certain forms of interpretation and meaning and not to others, especially in
view of possible (natural or social) constraints; and therefore it equally lacks a means to criticize
interpretations from an outside point of view. As a consequence, potential users are largely left to
their own devices: research offers no guidance as to what could be “better” interpretations; users
are seen as totally free in adopting meanings and therefore as responsible for their own practices.
Put differently, the paradigm is unable to offer a realistic theory of the learning of meanings, in-
cluding the meanings offered by its own work.
THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHAT
Vygotsky himself already intended to find a way to combine the “two psychologies” of his day
(Vygotsky, 1997). Although we would now express the basic tenets of both paradigms and their
opposition in a different way, I think that the way of thinking that is present in his theories and more
recently in CHAT does indeed give us a possibility to look at the problem in a fresh way. As CHAT
is very much a theory under construction, it is impossible for me to give an account of it that covers
all of its currently existing varieties. I refer to what I see as a promising interpretation, but I have no
doubt that additions and changes will be necessary or even that totally different interpretations ex-
ist, which may also necessitate different inferences in the area of methods.
Central to my rendition is the “genetic approach” (cf. Wertsch, 1985). Here, the human mind
and human individual personality are seen as the result of a development process in which culture
and its history, represented in and mediated by cultural artifacts, are primary. Humans develop
into individual personalities whose actions are guided by identity narratives by learning to partici-
pate in communities of practice that are related to historically developed and developing activity
systems. The nature of this learning process, both in terms of the affordances and constraints of-
fered by specific activity systems and in terms of the ways individual learners give meaning to
their participation in them, is of paramount importance for the development of human agency.
This theoretical view of development and learning is, of course, also valid for the situation in
which potential users learn from work done in the scientific community. Thus, whereas in the
other two paradigms this kind of learning is not (and cannot be) reflected within the paradigm it-
self, in CHAT the way users are convinced of the quality of research and its “products” becomes
itself an issue that is open to theoretical and empirical discourse. CHAT theory can become
self-reflexive in this way. It does not need to rely on a preconceived image of a mythical general-
ized user. Instead, it can adjust the criteria for research (and for divulging its results) according to
its theory-driven image of how learning processes are enhanced.
This does not mean that in CHAT we can use either nomological or interpretive categories and
criteria according to what a research situation seems to demand. Let me remind the reader that the
discussion is not about whether in some situations people (potential users, say) have more or less
freedom to construct their own views of the world. Instead, it is about the question of whether an
adequate world view is based on “objective” knowledge or on culturally held (and possibly rela-
tivistic) meaning systems. And although I certainly do not want to give the impression that all
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CHAT-oriented researchers agree, or should agree, on this issue, I think that, based on research
done within this orientation, a strong case can be made for the statement that CHAT does not fully
endorse either view of learning. In fact, we can probably say that both are at best incomplete be-
cause they imply an abstract view of human beings, abstract in the sense that in both views hu-
mans are seen as individuals unrelated to actual human activities and the communities in which
these activities are practiced. By relating “adequacy” to the concepts of activity, practice, and
community, we can establish a way of thinking that ultimately can overcome the limitations of
both “paradigms.” Doing this leads to a rather pragmatistic twist in our thinking about the aims of
social research.
People interpret the world in specific ways not just because that interpretation is “objective” or
because everybody else thinks the same way. Interpretations are held because they enable us to
participate in specific practices that have meaning for us. Interpretations are changed if and when
they enable us to participate more fully and thus at the same time produce a better practice. As
Rogoff (1995) said, learning always takes place on three planes at the same time: the community,
interpersonal, and personal planes.
The criterion for what constitutes a “better” practice cannot be whether the participants have
learned to do as the researcher told them. Neither, on the other hand, can it be that all participants
feel satisfied with the outcome, even if it is important that they are. Nor is there a logic of develop-
ment for practices, some sort of absolute direction or end point as in Piaget’s theory, against which
to measure the outcome. So what sort of criteria do we have? How can we escape the danger of rel-
ativism inherent in the interpretive paradigm?
Every practice may be seen as a culturally structured way to reach the specific ends of an ac-
tivity, or in other words to satisfy specific human needs. This has to be done under certain con-
straints, some of which are culturally imposed, some dependent on the situation, and some of a
physical nature. A better practice may be defined as one that succeeds in reaching its ends in a
more complete way while still meeting all of the constraints. Of course, we should keep in mind
here that every activity is complex as to its ends. Moreover, both the ends and at least some of
the constraints are cultural co-constructions and either they themselves or the way we under-
stand them may be changed, for instance as a result of a scientific research project. As a conse-
quence, there is no easy or quick way to determine whether a particular practice has improved in
this way, but we can usually find at least some indications. On the other hand, most solutions
create side effects and new constraints. Especially, we should not look for quick and easy solu-
tions because generally those will not satisfy all of the constraints as perceived by the partici-
pants. That is exactly what happens when the recipes that are the product of traditional
nomological research are presented to a practice: the practitioners will often feel that such a rec-
ipe is either only a partial solution to their problem or does not take all the constraints into ac-
count (cf. Robinson, 1998).
As in the nomological and the interpretive paradigms, this image of what constitutes the aim of
research cannot in itself be a criterion for good research: that would require us to know before the
fact that a positive change in practices will occur as a result of doing a research project. Criteria for
the quality of research must aim at optimizing the impact of research, but even the best thought-out
projects may not have the intended consequences. I do not feel capable to propose a fully adequate
set of criteria that might be used in designing and evaluating research projects or programs at this
moment. However, in the following, I offer some explorations into possible lines of thinking about
such criteria. Whether this will make journal editors any happier remains to be seen.
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DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH
Even if research is focused on the personal plane, we should be aware of the community level of ac-
tivity and of the dynamic character of that activity as the context of the personal plane. In other
words, research is not about a stable and objective world or about stable narratives of it, but it is al-
ways about change and learning and its relation to actions. In the other paradigms, change as a re-
sult of learning comes after the research has been done; in CHAT (or at least, in my interpretation of
it), learning and the resulting change are the object of the research, and a state of the world, or of a
person, at any given moment is interpreted as the result of change and development. Thus, the
product of research is not knowledge in the sense of a product that can be transferred to other per-
sons and situations; it is an understanding of the change processes in a specific situation that may or
may not have implications for other situations. Knowledge is a mediational means for focusing our
attention on specific aspects of a practice.
Research is focused on practical activities organized in activity systems. It should take into ac-
count both the historical and the actual dynamics of that practice. In other words, it should be both
genetically and contextually adequate. As these dynamics are the result of meaning-making dis-
courses, research should be sensitive to the socially constructed character of activity structures.
Much of the standard educational research does not do this. For example, lack of motivation in pu-
pils is often attributed to a lack of competence or even a flawed character structure of the pupils,
instead of to specific qualities of the school system. Such theories are not contextually adequate. I
also quote Gudmundsdottir’s (2001) paraphrase of Bakhtin: “School practice is overpopulated
with the intentions of others. Forcing it to submit to one’s own intentions is a difficult and compli-
cated process. Every action and every word carried out within a role (be it as teacher, as pupil, or
as researcher) is only half the individual’s and half the tradition’s.” This implies that our knowl-
edge of activity systems is contextual, as opposed to the decontextualized (or rather, seemingly
decontextualized) knowledge in the nomological paradigm. However, this contextualization is
not limited to the actual context-as-experienced, as in the interpretive paradigm. In CHAT re-
search, the context includes the global, political, and historical aspects of the activity system un-
der study. The way in which we try to change the activity should take account of this.
From all this, it becomes evident that research cannot be seen as the disinterested study of a
practice. Instead, the results are the product of the interaction between two practices, the research
practice and the practice under study. This draws our attention to the fact that change is not only
induced after a research project has ended. Whenever a researcher enters a practice with her in-
struments, it creates a potential for learning and change. This implies that both the results of mea-
surement and the direction in which the practice is going to change are co-constructions of the
researcher and the practitioners, mediated by the institution and its history. In a sense, research is
always a dialogue between a researcher and the respondents: they form a “community of inquiry,”
whether they realize it or not. This makes the researcher co-responsible for both the research re-
sults and the practice changes. In that sense, no objectivity is possible, and all research constitutes
an intervention in a practice. As Smagorinsky (1995, 1998) showed, an idea about the desired di-
rection of change is always already implicit in measurement instruments. This does not mean,
however, that this idea is the only one possible. There is no pre-given or logically ideal telos,
which implies that any implied telos is the co-responsibility of the co-researchers.
That “data” are a co-construction leads to the idea that transformational, collaborative research
(see, e.g., Cobb, 1998) may be seen as the paradigmatic form of research, just as the controlled ex-
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periment is the paradigmatic form in the nomological paradigm, because the essential elements
are made explicit there. Especially important is that this type of research tries to use the dialogue
between the researcher and the practitioners to its fullest extent. Whereas in other forms of re-
search the instruments limit the dialogue to specific prescribed forms and topics, in
transformational collaborative research the dialogue is the method. We should note that the term
dialogue has a wider meaning here than usual. It implies not only talking, but also acting together,
and in it the wider cultural and historical contexts of both the activity system and the participants
resonate, so that it is probably more accurate to speak of a polylogue. Moreover, the goal of this
polylogue has not been one-sidedly determined by the researcher who wants to assemble data, but
it is about possible development of a practice. Its intention is to establish a “discursive rationality”
in which alternative practices are discussed and tried out.
This, however, does not automatically mean that all research projects should have the form of
transformational collaborative research. Cole (1996, p. 256), for instance, mentions that in some
cases, an existing activity structure may be strictly enough regimented to enable us to do quasi-ex-
perimental research that is still ecologically valid. However, I doubt that this is the case in educa-
tion (but more so in countries with a very centralized education regime, such as the National
Curriculum in England and Wales). Also, in many research forms members of the community of
practice may be present only in a virtual form, as partners in a virtual polylogue. But even in such
cases, it means that we should never regard data as objective descriptors of an independent world.
It also means that we, as researchers, cannot be indifferent to what happens to a field of practice
after we leave. Having ideals about that practice on the basis of a critical consciousness is essential
to research. As I argued elsewhere (Wardekker, 1998), a critical view of existing practices and an
ideal concerning good practice that transcends the existing are integral parts of “scientific con-
cepts.” Research is inherently ethical.
The introduction of research instruments into a practice, including dialogue between the re-
searcher and the practitioners, is itself change-inducing. The results of using these instruments are
co-constructions. Therefore, as Smagorinsky (1995) made clear, instruments and their use should
be adequate for the way the participants construct their practice and for the possibilities they have
of using the instruments as elements in a Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD). Note, for in-
stance, the comments on Luria’s well-known project among the peasants of Uzbekistan
(Smagorinsky, 1995; Wertsch & Tulviste, 1992). Luria’s conclusion, that these peasants func-
tioned on a lower level of intelligence because they had not been involved in important cultural
changes, is flawed according to these comments; it is an artefact of the research instruments that
were outside the cultural sphere of the respondents, and thus outside their ZPD, so no adequate
co-construction could take place.
The aim of research is not to find “objective” knowledge about a practice or about the natural
laws that govern that practice, knowledge that others then can use to develop their practice by
transferring it to their own situation. Instead, the development of practice by way of establishing a
“discursive rationality” is the aim of the research project itself, and researchers should be aware of
this. Therefore, co-establishing an adequate setting for the project is an essential part of research
to which a lot of time and attention must be devoted. Also, conceptual, attitudinal, and behavioral
change should be monitored, and adequate categories for the description of changes should be de-
veloped. This should lead to a deeper understanding of the change process as one of the project re-
sults. Finally, a convergence of interpretations of the change process among all participants
(including the researchers) may well be an indication of a successful project. The influence of re-
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search in practice is most evident in transformative collaborative research, but even if the dialogue
between researchers and practitioners takes a more virtual form (as in theoretical work), the re-
searcher cannot be indifferent to practice change. This is not a moral exhortation; instead, it fol-
lows from the very nature of the relation between research and practice.
The aim of research, however, is not purely to change a given practice. We want changes to en-
dure beyond the limits of a research project; we also want changes to have some impact outside
the specific research setting. Therefore, I conclude with a number of suggestions to realize this.
1. To be able to work toward a better practice and still evaluate the results, researchers need to
strike a balance between participation and distantiation. They have to be stimulating partners in a
dialogue, but at the same time they must not be carried away by their enthusiasm. The French soci-
ologist Touraine, for instance, has developed a method in which he splits up these functions over
two persons, one the participant and the other the analyst (cf. Dubet & Wieviorka, 1996).
2. The participants in a change process should be able to maintain and further develop the re-
sulting changes in a practice after the researchers have left. That is, the new practices should be-
come part of their zone of actual development. Sustainability (Cole, 1996) is a criterion in the
evaluation of research projects.
3. Ideally, the results of a project should not be limited to just the situation in which that pro-
ject took place. Although results are not transferable in the classical way, or “generalizable,” they
ought to have “generative power.” This power depends, among other things, on the balance be-
tween results and investments, the question of whether in other situations the same or at least rec-
ognizable constraints apply, and the way in which the results are made known to others.
4. Publications about research projects should make clear in what way these questions and cri-
teria were met and how the researcher made sure of that. They should also offer enough ideas and
heuristics so that others may be inspired to try something along the same lines. However, publica-
tions are probably not the most effective means to generate “transfer” to other practices. Changes
in practices spread according to an “ink blot” model, as more people become acquainted with them
and use them as positive heuristics. Publications generally do not have much power to influence the
identity narratives of people in that way. They can, however, draw attention to possible sources of
inspiration.
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